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Abstract
In this paper we investigate a Principal-Agent problem with moral hazard under Knightian
uncertainty. We extend the seminal framework of Holmström and Milgrom by combining a
Stackelberg equilibrium with a worst-case approach. We investigate a general model in the
spirit of [14]. We show that optimal contracts depend on the output and its quadratic variation,
as an extension of the works of [31] (by dropping all the restrictive assumptions) and [44] (by
considering a general class of admissible contracts). We characterize the best reaction effort
of the agent through the solution to a second order BSDE and we show that the value of
the problem of the Principal is the viscosity solution of an Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs
equation, without needing a dynamic programming principle, by using stochastic Perron’s
method.
Key words: moral hazard, Principal-Agent, second order BSDEs, volatility uncertainty,
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs PDEs, stochastic Perron’s method.
AMS 2010 subject classifications: 93E20, 91A15, 49L25.
1 Introduction
Coming from the US army and used afterwards in the business glossary, the acronym VUCA reflects
the major issues encountered to investigate risk analysis: Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity and
Ambiguity1. The notion of volatility is at the heart of mathematical finance, where unstable
properties of financial products, such as prices, are modeled through the presence of noise in their
dynamics. Uncertainty is the lack of knowledge for an active agent, due to information asymmetries
between him/her and the other parts involved. Complexity holds when several interconnected
entities interact, leading to issues whose solutions are not obvious at first sight. Typically, the
difficulties appearing in contract theory with moral hazard come from these first three concepts. In
the canonical situation, a first entity named the Principal (she) designs a monetary contract to hire
another entity, named the Agent (he) to manage her wealth. The Agent has the possibility to accept
or reject the contract proposed by the Principal, so that the Principal must provide sufficiently
good incentives to the Agent constrained to ensure that his reservation utility is attained. The
Agent thus provides an effort which directly impacts the value of the Principal’s wealth. The
∗Department of Mathematics, Univerisity of Michigan, nihernan@umich.edu.
†CMAP-École Polytechnique, Route de Saclay, Palaiseau, France. thibaut.mastrolia@polytechnique.fr
1See for instance What VUCA Really Means for You, N. Bennett and GJ. Lemoine, Harvard Business Review,
January-February 2014.
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main difficulty is that the Principal has to design the contract without observing directly the
effort provided by her Agent. We identify commonly this situation with a Stackelberg equilibrium
between the Principal and the Agent: first the Principal anticipates the best reaction effort of the
Agent for any given fixed salary. Then, taking into account the optimal efforts, she maximizes
her utility and computes the optimal contract satisfying the reservation utility constraint. This
paradigm appeared in the 1970’s in discrete time models and has then been reformulated by
Holmström and Milgrom in [24] in a continuous time version of the problem in which the work of
the Agent is to control the drift of a Brownian diffusion. We refer to the monographs [43] and [15]
for more explanation, general overviews and mathematical treatments of this theory.
Several extensions of the work of Holmström and Milgrom have recently surfaced. A first noticeable
extension is the study of Sannikov [38] by studying a Principal-Agent problem with a retiring
random time chosen by the Principal. In particular, Sannikov roughly emphasized that the problem
of the Principal has to be seen as a stochastic control problem where the continuation utility of
the Agent is a state variable. This idea was rigorously extended later in the works of Cvitanić,
Possamaï and Touzi in [13, 14] by investigating a Principal-Agent problem in which the Agent
can control both the drift and the volatility of the wealth of the Principal. More precisely, they
show that when the Agent takes also supremum over the possible volatilities, his value function
is the solution to a second order BSDE (2BSDE for short), which the theory was introduced by
Sonner, Touzi and Zhang in [40] and improved by Possamaï, Tan and Zhou in [35]. The so-called
dynamic programming approach of Cvitanić, Possamaï and Touzi consists in restricting the set of
contracts offered to the Agent to a suitable class so that the problem of the Principal is reduced to
a standard stochastic control problem associated with a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. The
main difference between the unrestricted and the restricted class of contracts lies in the absolutely
continuity of the increasing process appearing in the 2BSDE associated with the problem of the
Agent. By building absolutely continuous approximations of the increasing process, they show
that the restricted and the unrestricted problems have the same value.
In this paper we incorporate the last component of VUCA,Ambiguity, into the standard Principal-
Agent problem. To quote Bennett and Lemoine "Ambiguity characterizes situations where there
is doubt about the nature of cause-and-effect relationships". We model ambiguity by introducing
a third player in the system, named the Nature, which randomly modifies the volatility of the
project. As usual, the Agent is hired by the Principal to control the drift of an output process and
the Principal cannot observe the actions of the Agent. However, the Principal and the Agent are
not informed about the volatility of the project and they just have some beliefs about it. Since
we work under weak formulation, the uncertainty on the volatility is represented by assigning to
the Principal and the Agent different sets of probability measures under which they make their
decisions. We adopt a worst case approach against this scenario so that both individuals present
an extreme ambiguity aversion to the problem. They act as if the third individual, the Nature,
was playing against them and choosing the worst possible volatility. As a consequence, both the
Principal and the Agent play zero-sum stochastic differential games against the Nature. This work
is an extension of the models proposed by Mastrolia and Possamaï [31] and Sung [44] to more
general frameworks, by dropping several explicit and implicit assumptions made in these papers.
We consider a more general framework by not considering only exponential utilities and by not
restricting a priori the class of admissible contracts.
Since the seminal work of Isaacs [25], differential games and more particularly zero-sum games
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have received a growing interest. As an overview of works related to this theory, let us recall some
noticeable and relevant studies inspiring the present paper and the mathematical tools that they
used. Lions and Souganidis have investigated stochastic differential games in [30] by using the
viscosity solutions theory, introduced in the works of Lions [27, 29, 28]. Hamadène and Lepeltier
have then proved in [22] the existence of a saddle point when the so-called Isaacs’ condition is
satisfied with the help of classical BSDEs. These works were then generalized to more general
dynamics by Buckdahn and Li in [9], allowing both the drift and the diffusion terms of the output
process to be impacted by control processes. Cardaliaguet and Rainer have then introduced a
new notion of strategies, called path-wise strategies, to solve a differential game in [12, 11]. It
was then extended by Bayraktar and Yao in [4] by considering unbounded controls and by using
a weak dynamic programming approach. Notice that all of these works mainly deal with Isaacs’
condition. Buckdahn, Li and Quincampoix have then sucessfully characterized the value of a
stochastic differential games without assuming Isaacs’ condition in [10], by using viscosity solutions
theory together with a randomization procedure of the stochastic control processes. All these works
frame zero-sum games under strong formulation. The work of Pham and Zhang [34] investigates
a non-Markovian zero-sum game in the weak formulation, more suitable2 for Principal-Agent
problems with moral hazard, by using path-dependent PDEs.
All the previous papers treat stochastic differential games with a dynamic programming principle
approach (DPP for short). Although El Karoui and Tan have proved in [18, 19] that a DPP holds
for very general stochastic control problems, this is not the case for stochastic differential games.
As explained in the paper of Hamadène, Lepeltier and Peng [23], a game of type "control against
control" may not lead to a DPP. A central point of our work is to avoid DPP by following the
stochastic Perron’s method developed by Bayraktar and Sîrbu in [1, 2, 3], and applied to stochastic
differential games by Sîrbu in [39].
In our problem, we aim at mixing zero-sum differential games with Stackelberg equilibrium by
following partially the dynamic programming approach introduced in [14]. The Agent does not
choose the volatility of the outcome process but his worst case approach leads to reduce his problem
to the solution to a 2BSDE, seen as an infimum of BSDEs over a set of probability measures. Unlike
[14], the problem of the Principal becomes a non-standard stochastic differential game, because the
worst probability measures for the Agent and the Principal do not necessarily coincide. The main
contribution of this paper is to prove that the value function of the Principal is a viscosity solution to
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI for short) equation associated to a restricted problem,
as soon as a comparison result holds. The method that we use is based on the stochastic Perron’s
method of Bayraktar and Sîrbu [1, 2, 3, 39] and prevents a dynamic programming principle for our
problem, which may be quite hard to check in practice. The stochastic Perron’s method amounts
to a verification result and it consists in proving that the value function of the Principal lies
between a viscosity super-solution (the supremum of the stochastic sub-solutions) and a viscosity
sub-solution (the infimum of the stochastic super-solutions) of the HJBI equation. Thus, as soon as
a comparison theorem holds for such PDE, and the set of stochastic semi-solutions are non-empty,
it follows that the value function of the Principal coincides with the unique viscosity solution.
Moreover, the DPP also follows from the definition of the stochastic semi-solutions. The only
restriction that we made in our work is to deal with piecewise controls for the problem of the
Principal. Although this assumption is restrictive, it is very common in stochastic control theory
2See [15, Section 10.4.1]
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and meaningful as explained in [39]. Moreover, in view of [34, 41] we expect that the value function
associated to this restricted problem coincide with the general problem.
The structure of the paper is the following, in Section 2 we define the framework and the model.
The problem of the Agent is solved in Section 3. Section 4 is at the heart of our study and is the
main contribution of our paper. After having studied the degeneracies of our problem, we prove
that the value function of the Principal is a viscosity solution to the HJBI equation associated
to a restricted problem, as soon as a comparison result holds, without assuming that a dynamic
programming principle holds by using stochastic Perron’s method. We also discuss examples in
which we can expect that the comparison result is satisfied. To ease the reading of the paper, some
technical definitions and the proofs of the two main results are postponed to the appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Canonical process, semi-martingale measure and quadratic variation
We fix a maturity T > 0 and a positive integer d. Let C
(
[0, T ] ,Rd
)
be the space of continuous
maps from [0, T ] into Rd and let Ω := {ω ∈ C
(
[0, T ] ,Rd
)
: ω0 = 0} be the canonical space endowed
with the uniform norm
‖ω‖∞ = sup
t∈[0,T ]
‖ωt‖.
We denote by X the canonical process on Ω, i.e. Xt(x) = xt, for all x ∈ Ω and t ∈ [0, T ]. We
set G := (Gt)t∈[0,T ] the filtration generated by X and G
+ := (G+t )t∈[0,T ] its right limit, where
G+t :=
⋂
s>t Gs for s ∈ [0, T ) and G
+
T := GT . We denote by P0 the Wiener measure on (Ω,GT ). Let
M(Ω) be the set of all probability measures on (Ω,GT ). Recall the so–called universal filtration
G⋆ := {G⋆t }0≤t≤T defined as follows
G⋆t :=
⋂
P∈M(Ω)
GPt ,
where GPt is the usual completion under P.
For any subset P ⊂ M(Ω), a P−polar set is a P−negligible set for all P ∈ P, and we say that
a property holds P−quasi-surely if it holds outside some P−polar set. We also introduce the
filtration FP := {FPt }0≤t≤T , defined by
FPt := G
⋆
t ∨ T
P , t ≤ T,
where T P is the collection of P−polar sets, and its right-continuous limit, denoted FP,+ :=
(FP,+t )t∈[0,T ], and we omit the indexation with respect to P when there is no ambiguity on it.
For any subset P ⊂M(Ω) and any (t,P) ∈ [0, T ]× P we denote
P[P,F+, t] :=
{
P′ ∈ P, P′ = P on F+t
}
.
We also recall that for every probability measure P on Ω and F−stopping time τ taking values
in [0, T ], there exists a family of regular conditional probability distribution (r.c.p.d. for short)
(Pτx)x∈Ω (see e.g. [42]), satisfying Properties (i)− (iv) of [35] and we refer to [35, Section 2.1.3] for
more details on it.
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We say that P ∈ M(Ω) is a semi–martingale measure if X is a semi–martingale under P. We
denote by PS the set of all semi-martingale measures. We set Md,n(R) the space of matrices with
d rows and n columns with real entries. It is well-known, see for instance the result of [26], that
there exists an F-progressively measurable process denoted by 〈X〉 := (〈X〉t)t∈[0,T ] coinciding with
the quadratic variation of X, P − a.s. for any P ∈ PS , with density with respect to the Lebesgue
measure at time t ∈ [0, T ] denoted by a non-negative symmetric matrix σ̂t ∈ Md,d(R) defined by
σ̂t := lim sup
ε−→0
ε>0
〈X〉t − 〈X〉t−ε
ε
.
The formal definition of all the functional spaces mentioned in this paper can be found in Appendix
A.
2.2 Weak formulation of the output process
We start by defining A and N as the sets of F-adapted processes taking values in A and N
respectively, where A,N are compact subsets of some finite dimensional space. We call control
process every pair (α, ν) ∈ A × N. To clarify the notations for the rest of the paper, α has to
be understood as the control of the Agent and ν as the control of the Nature. Consider next the
volatility coefficient for the controlled process
σ : [0, T ]× Ω×N −→Md,n(R),
which is assumed to be uniformly bounded and such that σσ⊤(·, n) is an invertible F-progressively
measurable process for any n ∈ N . For every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Ω and ν ∈ N, we set the following
SDE driven by an n-dimensional Brownian motion W
Xt,x,νs = x(t) +
∫ s
t
σ(r,Xt,x,ν , νr)dWr, s ∈ [t, T ], (2.1)
Xt,x,νr = x(r), r ∈ [0, t].
Similarly to [14], we build a control model through the weak solutions of SDE (2.1). We say (P, ν)
is a weak solution of (2.1) if the law of Xt,x,νt under P is δx(t)
3 and there exists a P−Brownian
motion4, denoted by W P, such that
Xs = x(t) +
∫ s
t
σ(r,X, νr)dW
P
r , s ∈ [t, T ], P− a.s. (2.2)
We will denote by N (t, x) the set of weak solutions to SDE (2.1). We also define the set P(t, x) of
probability measures which are components of weak solutions by
P(t, x) :=
⋃
ν∈N
Pν(t, x), where Pν(t, x) := {P ∈M(Ω), (P, ν) ∈ N (t, x)} .
We conclude this section by showing that the set P(t, x) satisfies an important property which is
essential to deal with the wellposedness of 2BSDEs, the main tool we will use later to solve the
problem of the Agent. We recall the definition of a saturated set of probability measures (see [35,
Definition 5.1]).
3δ denotes the Dirac measure.
4We refer to [42, Theorem 4.5.2] for more details on it.
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Definition 2.1 (Saturated set of probability measures.). A set P ⊂M(Ω) is said to be saturated
if for an arbitrary P ∈ P, any probability Q ∈ M(Ω) which is equivalent to P and under which X
is a local martingale, belongs to P.
We thus have the following Lemma, whose proof follows the same lines that [14, Proof of Propo-
sition 5.3, step (i)]
Lemma 2.1. The family {P(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Ω} is saturated.
2.3 Estimate sets of volatility
The beliefs of the Agent and the Principal about the volatility of the project will be summed up in
the families of measures (PA(t, x))(t,x)∈[0,T ]×Ω and (PP (t, x))(t,x)∈[0,T ]×Ω respectively, which satisfy
that PA(t, x) ∪PP (t, x) ⊂ P(t, x) for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω. We emphasize that the families PA
and PP cannot be chosen completely arbitrarily, and have to satisfy a certain number of stability
and measurability properties, which are classical in stochastic control theory, in order to use the
theory of 2BSDEs developed in [35]. The following assumption guarantees the well–posedness of
2BSDEs defined in the set of beliefs of the Principal and the Agent.
Assumption 2.1. For Ψ = A,P , the set PΨ(t, x) satisfies properties (iii) (semi-analyticity of the
graph of PΨ), (iv) (stability under conditioning) and (v) (stability under concatenation) in [35,
Assumption 2.1].
In particular, property (iii) implies that the sets PA(t, x) and PP (t, x) at time t = 0 are indepen-
dent of x. We thus define
PA := PA(0, x), PP := PP (0, x) for every x ∈ Ω.
An example of estimate sets of volatility which satisfy Assumption 2.1 is the learning model
presented in [31].
Example 2.1. Consider, for Ψ = A,P , set–valued processes DΨ : [0, T ] × Ω 7−→ 2
R⋆+ such that
for every t ∈ [0, T ]{
(s, ω,A) ∈ [0, t] × Ω× R⋆+, A ∈ DΨ(s, ω)
}
∈ B([0, t]) ⊗Ft ⊗ B(R
⋆
+),
where B([0, t]) and B(R⋆+) denote the Borel σ−algebra of [0, t] and R
⋆
+ respectively. Define next,
for every (t, w) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω, the set PΨ(t, ω) as the set of probability measures P ∈M(Ω) such that
σ̂s(w
′) ∈ DΨ(s+ t, ω ⊗t w
′), for ds⊗ dP− a.e. (s,w′) ∈ [0, T − t]× Ω.
It is shown in [33] that the sets PΨ(t, ω) satisfy Assumption 2.1.
In the context of the previous example, [31] studies the case where
DA(t, ω) = [σ
A
t (ω), σ
A
t (ω)], DP (t, ω) = [σ
P
t (ω), σ
P
t (ω)],
for certain processes (σP , σA, σP , σA) ∈
(
H0(R∗+,F)
)4
. We refer to their paper for an interpretation
of such model.
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To conclude this section, we define the set of weak solutions to the SDE (2.1) associated to the
beliefs of the Principal of the Agent
NA(t, x) = {(P, ν) ∈ N (t, x) : P ∈ PA(t, x)} , NP (t, x) = {(P, ν) ∈ N (t, x) : P ∈ PP (t, x)} .
We define the sets NA and NP equivalently. The importance of these sets is that, as explained
in the next section, both the Principal and the Agent consider that the volatility of the outcome
process is chosen from one of them, according to their beliefs.
2.4 The contracting problem
We study a generalization of both the classical problem of Holmström and Milgrom [24] and the
problem of moral hazard under volatility uncertainty studied in [31, 44]. In our model, the Agent
is hired by the Principal to control the drift of the outcome process X, but none of them have
certainty about what is the volatility of the project. Both sides observe X and have a "worst-case"
approach to the contract, in the sense that they act as if a third player, the "Nature", was playing
against them by choosing the worst possible volatility.
2.4.1 Admissible efforts
As usual in the literature, we work under the weak formulation of the Principal-Agent problem.
Therefor, the set of controls of the Agent is restricted to the ones for which an appropriate change
of measure can be applied to the weak solutions of SDE (2.1). In this section we precise the
condition required on a control to be an admissible effort and the impact of the actions of the
Agent in the outcome process.
The Agent exerts an effort α ∈ A to manage the project, unobservable by the Principal, impacting
the outcome process through the drift coefficient b : [0, T ] × Ω × A × N −→ Rn, which satisfies
that b(·, a, n) is an F-progressively measurable process for every (a, n) ∈ A×N . The actions of the
Agent are costly for him, so his benefits are penalized by a cost function c : [0, T ]× Ω× A −→ R
such that for every a ∈ A, c(·, a) is an F−progressively measurable process. We assume that for
some p > 1 there exists κ ∈ (1, p] such that
sup
P∈PA
EP
[
ess supP
0≤t≤T
EP
[(∫ T
0
sup
a∈A
|c(s,X, a)|κds
) p
κ ∣∣∣G+t
]]
< +∞. (2.3)
The Agent discounts the future through a map k : [0, T ]×Ω×A×N −→ R, such that k(·, a, n) is
an F−progressively measurable process for every (a, n) ∈ A×N . For some (ℓ,m,m) ∈ [1,+∞)×
[ℓ,+∞)× (0, ℓ +m− 1], we impose the following conditions on the maps b, c and k
Assumption (Hℓ,m,m). There exists 0 < κ < κ such that for any (t, x, a, n) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω×A×N
(i) The drift b satisfies
‖b(t, x, a, n)‖ ≤ κ
(
1 + ‖x‖t,+∞ + ‖a‖
ℓ
)
, ‖∂ab(t, x, a, n)‖ ≤ κ
(
1 + ‖a‖ℓ−1
)
.
(ii) The map a 7−→ c(t, x, a) is increasing, strictly convex and continuously differentiable for any
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω and satisfies
0 ≤ c(t, x, a) ≤ κ
(
1 + ‖x‖t,∞ + ‖a‖
ℓ+m
)
,
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κ‖a‖m ≤ ‖∂ac(t, x, a)‖ ≤ κ
(
1 + ‖a‖ℓ+m−1
)
and lim‖a‖→∞
c(t, x, a)
‖a‖ℓ
= +∞.
(iii) The discount factor k is uniformly bounded by κ.
Remark 2.1. For (ℓ,m,m) = (1, 1, 1) we exactly recover the model studied in [31].
We present finally the definition of admissible efforts of the Agent.
Definition 2.2 (Admissible efforts). A control process α ∈ A is said to be admissible, if for every
(P, ν) ∈ NA the following process is an (F,P)–martingale(
E
(∫ t
0
σ⊤(σσ⊤)−1(s,X, νs)b(s,X, αs, νs) · dW
P
s
))
t∈[0,T ]
. (2.4)
We denote by A the set of admissible efforts.
Finally, we present the impact of the actions of the Agent in the outcome process. Consider an
admissible effort α ∈ A and (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Ω. For every subset N ⊂ N (t, x) define
Nα :=
{
(Pα, ν),
dPα
dP
= E
(∫ T
t
σ⊤(σσ⊤)−1(s,X, νs)b(s,X, αs, νs) · dW
P
s
)
, (P, ν) ∈ N
}
.
Thus, under Assumption (Hℓ,m,m), by Girsanov’s Theorem we have for any α ∈ A, and for any
(Pα, ν) ∈ Nα
Xs = xt +
∫ s
t
b(r,X, αr , νr)dr +
∫ s
t
σ(r,X, νr)dW
α
r , s ∈ [t, T ], P
α − a.s., (2.5)
where Wα is a Pα−Brownian motion. More precisely,
Wα := W P −
∫ ·
t
σ⊤(σσ⊤)−1(r,X, νr)b(r,X, αr , νr)dr,
for some P ∈ P.
2.4.2 Admissible contracts
The Principal offers to the Agent a final salary taking place on the horizon T . Since the Principal
can observe merely the outcome process X, a contract corresponds to an FT -measurable random
variable ξ. The Agent benefits from the payments of the Principal through his utility function
UA : R −→ R, which depends on his terminal remuneration and is a continuous, increasing and
concave map. The Principal benefits from her wealth, penalized by the salary given to the Agent
through her utility function UP : R −→ R which is a continuous, increasing and concave map.
The outcome process is not necessarily monetary so the Principal possesses a liquidation function
L : R −→ R which is assumed to be continuous with linear growth. The following (classical) notion
of admissibility for the set of contracts proposed by the Principal is due to the fact that we will
reduce later the problem of the Agent to solve a 2BSDE.
Definition 2.3 (Admissible contracts). A contract ξ is called admissible, if
• For some p > 1 there exists κ ∈ [1, p) such that UA(ξ) ∈ L
p,κ
0 (F,PA).
• For any (P, ν) ∈ NP we have E
P [UP (L(XT )− ξ)] < +∞.
We denote by C the class of admissible contracts.
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2.4.3 The problem of the Agent
For a given contract ξ ∈ C offered by the Principal, the utility of the Agent at time t = 0, if he
performs the action α ∈ A, is given by his worst–case approach over the set NαA of weak solutions
to (2.1) associated to his beliefs. That is
uA0 (ξ, α) := inf
(P,ν)∈NαA
EP
[
Kα,ν0,TUA(ξ)−
∫ T
0
Kα,ν0,s c(s,X, αs)ds
]
,
where
Kα,νs,t := exp
(
−
∫ t
s
k(u,X,αu, νu)du
)
, 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T.
The problem of the Agent, consisting into finding the action which maximizes his utility, is therefore
UA0 (ξ) := sup
α∈A
inf
(P,ν)∈NαA
EP
[
Kα,ν0,TUA(ξ)−
∫ T
0
Kα,ν0,s c(s,X, αs)ds
]
. (2.6)
We will denote by A⋆(ξ) the set of optimal α ∈ A when ξ is offered, and define the set of optimal
weak solutions
N ⋆A(ξ) :=
⋃
α⋆∈A⋆(ξ)
Nα
⋆
A .
2.4.4 The problem of the Principal
Since the strategy of the Principal is to anticipate the response of the Agent to the offered contracts,
she is restricted to offer contracts such that the Agent can optimally choose his Actions. Moreover,
the Agent accepts only contracts under which he obtains more benefits than his reservation utility
R0. Therefore, the set of admissible contracts is restricted to
Ξ := {ξ ∈ C, A⋆(ξ) 6= ∅, UA0 (ξ) ≥ R0}.
Notice that for any ξ ∈ Ξ, the set A⋆(ξ) is not necessarily reduced to a singleton. As is common
in the literature, we will assume that when there is more than one optimal strategy for the Agent,
he chooses one which is best for the Principal. We denote such a strategy by α⋆(x, ξ). Thus, the
problem of the Principal is to find the contract which maximizes her worst–case utility (under her
own beliefs)
U
p
0 := sup
ξ∈Ξ
inf
(P,ν)∈N
α⋆(x,ξ)
P
EP [UP (L(XT )− ξ)] . (2.7)
Remark 2.2. For the sake of simplicity, we do not add any discount factor for the Principal’s
problem (2.7). A model dealing with a discount factor kP : [0, T ]×Ω −→ R could be easily studied
and does not add any difficulties, as soon as kP is sufficiently integrable, by modifying the HJBI
equation (4.12) below.
3 Solving the Agent problem via 2BSDE
In this section we study the Agent’s problem (2.6). We follow both the study made in Section
4.1 of [31] by extending it to a more general framework, and [14] by adding uncertainty on the
volatility. We mention also that another approach which does not use the theory of 2BSDEs has
been proposed in [44].
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3.1 Definition of the Hamiltonian
Define the function F : [0, T ] × Ω×R× Rd ×A×N −→ R by
F (t, x, y, z, a, n) := −k(t, x, a, n)y − c(t, x, a) + b(t, x, a, n) · z.
Define also for every (t, x,Σ) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω× S+d the set
Vt(x,Σ) :=
{
n ∈ N,σ(t, x, n)σ⊤(t, x, n) = Σ
}
,
and denote by V(σˆ2) the set of controls ν ∈ N with values in Vt(x, σˆ2t ), dt⊗P-a.e. for every P ∈ PA.
The Hamiltonian H : [0, T ] × Ω × R × Rd × S+d −→ R associated with the problem of the Agent
(2.6) is defined by (see [9])
H(t, x, y, z, γ) := inf
Σ∈S+
d
{
1
2
Tr(Σγ) + inf
n∈Vt(x,Σ)
sup
a∈A
F (t, x, y, z, a, n)
}
.
Notice that the infimum with respect to n ∈ N in the Hamiltonian has been taken in two stages
with the introduction of the sets Vt(x,Σ). We assume that the following assertion is enforced.
Assumption 3.1. The following Isaac’s condition is satisfied for any (t, x, y, z,Σ) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω×
Rd+1 × S+d
inf
n∈Vt(x,Σ)
sup
a∈A
F (t, x, y, z, a, n) = sup
a∈A
inf
n∈Vt(x,Σ)
F (t, x, y, z, a, n). (3.1)
Let us define the map F ⋆ : [0, T ]× Ω× Rd+1 × S+d −→ R by
F ⋆(t, x, y, z,Σ) := sup
a∈A
inf
n∈Vt(x,Σ)
F (t, x, y, z, a, n).
We thus state a fundamental lemma on the growth of any control α⋆ which is a saddle point in
(3.1). We refer to the proof of [20, Lemma 4.1] which fits our setting.
Lemma 3.1. Let Assumption (Hℓ,m,m) hold. Then, for any (t, x, y, z,Σ) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω×Rd+1×S+d
and for any maximiser α⋆ of F ⋆(t, x, y, z,Σ), there exists some positive constant C such that
‖α⋆(t, x, y, z,Σ)‖ ≤ C
(
1 + ‖z‖
1
m+1−ℓ
)
,
|F ⋆(t, x, y, z,Σ)| ≤ C
(
1 + ‖x‖t,∞ + |y|+ ‖z‖
ℓ+m
m+1−ℓ
)
.
3.2 2BSDEs representation of the Agent’s problem
Consider the following 2BSDE
Yt = UA(ξ) +
∫ T
t
F ⋆(s,X, Ys, Zs, σˆ
2
s)ds −
∫ T
t
Zs · dXs −
∫ T
t
dKs, PA − q.s. (3.2)
Recall now the notion of solution to this 2BSDE introduced in [40] and extended in [35].
Definition 3.1. We say that a triplet (Y,Z,K) is a solution to the 2BSDE (3.2) if there exists
p > 1 such that (Y,Z,K) ∈ Sp0(F
PA
+ ,PA) × H
p
0(F
PA ,PA) × K
p
0(F
PA ,PA) satisfies (3.2) and K
satisfies the minimality condition
Kt = ess inf
P
P′∈PA[P,F+,t]
EP
′
[
KT
∣∣∣FP,+t ] , t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s., ∀P ∈ PA. (3.3)
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Remark 3.1. Similarly to [14], we use here the result of [32] for stochastic integral by considering
the aggregative version of the non-decreasing process K.
From now, we set the standing assumption to be used in all the following results
Assumption 3.2 (S). For some (ℓ,m,m) ∈ [1,+∞)× [ℓ,+∞)× (0, ℓ +m− 1] with ℓ+m
m+1−ℓ ≤ 2,
Assumption (H)ℓ,m,m holds together with Assumptions 2.1.
We have the following result which ensures that the 2BSDE (3.2) is well-posed. Its proof is
postponed to the Appendix.
Lemma 3.2. Under Assumption (S), the 2BSDE (3.2) has a unique solution (Y,Z,K) for any ξ
in C.
The next Theorem is the main result of this section and it provides an equivalence between solving
the Agent’s problem (2.6) and the 2BSDE (3.2). Its proof is postponed to the Appendix and is
similar to the proof of [14, Proposition 5.4], being its extension to the worst-case volatility case.
Theorem 3.1. Let Assumption (S) hold and denote by (Y,Z,K) the solution to the 2BSDE (3.2).
Then, the value function of the Agent is given by
UA0 (ξ) = sup
α∈A
inf
(P,ν)∈NαA
EP [Y0] . (3.4)
Moreover, (α⋆,P⋆, ν⋆) ∈ A⋆(ξ)×N ⋆A(ξ) if and only if (α
⋆,P⋆, ν⋆) ∈ A×NA and satisfies
(i) (α⋆, ν⋆) attains the sup-inf in the definition of F ⋆(·,X, Y, Z, σ̂2), dt⊗ P⋆−a.e.,
(ii) KT = 0, P
⋆−a.s.
To conclude the section, let us comment the intuition behind this result and the limitations of our
model.
Remark 3.2. If the volatility of the outcome process is fixed and the Agent controls only the drift,
it is well-known that his value function is the solution to a BSDE. The worst-case approach of the
Agent makes his value function be the infimum of BSDEs and therefore the solution to a 2BSDE.
This reasoning works because the Agent controls only the drift and not the volatility of the outcome.
Indeed, by considering a controlled volatility coefficient σ(t, x, α, ν), the worst-case approach of the
Agent induces a first 2BSDE and the control α induces a second 2BSDE on top of that. Currently,
such kind of 2BSDEs has not been studied in the literature.
4 The Principal’s Problem
In this section, we aim at solving the contracting problem (2.7). This corresponds to an extension
of both [14] to the uncontrolled volatility case and [31] in a more general model, without assuming
that a dynamic programming principle holds for the value function of the Principal. We follow the
ideas of [1, 2, 39].
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4.1 A pathological stochastic control problem
To facilitate the understanding of this section, we provide a general overview of the method we
use, dividing it in the following steps.
Step 1. In Section 4.2, we rewrite the set of admissible contracts and the Principal’s problem
(2.7) making use of the results obtained in Section 3. We also make a distinction between the case
in which the estimation sets of the Principal and the Agent are disjoint and the case in which they
are not.
Step 2. In Section 4.3, we show that if the beliefs of the Principal and the Agent are disjoints,
there is a degeneracy in the sense that the Principal can propose to the Agent a sequence of
admissible contracts such that asymptotically she gets her maximal utility.
Step 3. We solve next the problem of the Principal in Section 4.4 when the beliefs about the
volatility of the Principal and the Agent are not disjoint by restricting the study to piece-wise
constant controls and by using Perron’s method.
In the following, we suppose that (S) and the next assumption are enforced.
Assumption 4.1 (Markovian case). All the objects considered are Markovian, i.e. they depend
on (t,X·) only through (t,Xt).
Remark 4.1. Assumption 4.1 may be removed if we deal with the theory of path dependent PDEs
(see among others [16, 37]). Here, we assume that it holds for the sake of simplicity and to focus
on the procedure to solve the Principal’s problem.
4.2 The problem and remark on the set of admissible contracts
The solution to the problem of the Agent provides a very particular form for UA(ξ). More precisely,
let (Y,Z,K) be the solution of 2BSDE (3.2), then
UA(ξ) = Y0 −
∫ T
0
F ⋆(s,Xs, Ys, Zs, σˆ
2
s)ds+
∫ T
0
Zs · dXs +
∫ T
0
dKs, PA − q.s., (4.1)
the process K satisfies the minimality condition (3.3), and
sup
α∈A
inf
(P,ν)∈NαA
EP [Y0] ≥ R0.
Let us define the set of F0−measurable random variables
Y0 :=
{
Y0, sup
α∈A
inf
(P,ν)∈NαA
EP [Y0] ≥ R0
}
.
Then, for any contract ξ ∈ Ξ there exists a triplet (Y0, Z,K) ∈ Y0 ×H
p
0(F
NA ,PA)×K
p
0(F
NA ,PA)
such that (3.3) and (4.1) hold. Since such a triplet is unique, we can establish a one-to-one
correspondence between the set of admissible contracts Ξ and an appropriate subset of Y0 ×
H
p
0(F
NA ,PA) × K
p
0(F
NA ,PA). However, as explained in [31], decomposition (4.1) only holds
PA−quasi surely and we have to take this fact into account in order to provide a suitable charac-
terization of the set of admissible contracts by means of this formula.
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For any (Y0, Z,K) ∈ Y0 × H
p
0(F
NA ,PA) × K
p
0(F
NA ,PA) such that K satisfies (3.3) and every
(P, t) ∈ PA × [0, T ], we define the process Y Y0,Z,K for any P ∈ PA by
Y
Y0,Z,K
t := Y0 −
∫ t
0
F ⋆(s,Xs, Y
Y0,Z,K
s , Zs, σˆ
2
s)ds +
∫ t
0
Zs · dXs +
∫ t
0
dKs, P− a.s. (4.2)
Recall that since k is bounded, F ⋆ is Lipschitz with respect to y, thus Y Y0,Z,K is well defined.
The definition is independent of the probability P because the stochastic integrals can be defined
pathwise (see [14, Definition 3.2] and the paragraph which follows).
Fix now Y0 ∈ Y0 and let KY0 be the set of pairs (Z,K) ∈ H
p
0(F
NA ,PA)×K
p
0(F
NA ,PA) sufficiently
integrable such that U−1A (Y
Y0,Z,K
T ) ∈ CPA and with K satisfying (3.3). The Principal has thus to
propose a contract with the form U−1A (Y
Y0,Z,K
T ) under every probability measure in the space PA.
Outside of the support of this space, the Principal is completely free on the salary given to the
Agent.
We denote by D the set of FT−measurable random variables ξ such that
ξ =
{
U−1A (Y
Y0,Z,K
T ), PA − q.s.,
ξ̂, PP \PA − q.s.,
(4.3)
for some triplet (Y0, Z,K) ∈ Y0×KY0 and some ξ̂ ∈ CPP \PA . The integrability conditions imposed
on Z, K and ξ̂ ensure us that D ⊂ Ξ. In fact, from the reasoning given in the paragraphs above we
have that D coincides with Ξ and (4.3) corresponds to a characterization of the set of admissible
contracts. Therefore, the problem of the Principal (2.7) becomes
UP0 = sup
(Y0,Z,K,ξ̂)∈Y0×KY0×CPP \PA
UP0 (U
−1
A (Y
Y0,Z,K
T ), ξ̂), (4.4)
with the following slight abuse of notations
UP0 (X , ξ̂) := min
{
inf
(P,ν)∈N
α⋆(X)
P ∩N
α⋆(X)
A
EP [UP (L(XT )− X )] , inf
(P,ν)∈N
α⋆(X)
P \N
α⋆(X)
A
EP
[
UP (L(XT )− ξ̂)
]}
.
4.3 Degeneracies for disjoint believes
Similarly to the study made in [31, Section 4.3.1.], if the believes of the Agent and the Principal
are disjoint, we face a pathological case caused by the fact that the Agent and the Principal do
not somehow live in the same world. Indeed, if PA ∩ PP = ∅ we have
UP0 = sup
(Y0,Z,K,ξ̂)∈Y0×KY0×CPP
inf
(P,ν)∈N
α⋆(X)
P
EP
[
UP (L(XT )− ξ̂)
]
, (4.5)
with X = U−1A (Y
Y0,Z,K
T ). We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. If PP ∩ PA = ∅ then U
P
0 = limx→∞UP (x).
Proof. LetM be any positive integer and define ξ̂M := L(XT )−M . Take any (Y0, Z,K) ∈ Y0×KY0
and set the admissible contract
ξM :=
{
U−1A (Y
Y0,Z,K
T ), PA − q.s.,
ξ̂M , PP − q.s.
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Then, we have
UP0 ≥ inf
(P,ν)∈N
α⋆(X)
P
EP [UP (L(XT )− L(XT ) +M)] = UP (M).
By making M →∞ we conclude, since the other inequality is trivial.
Interpretation. This result is the same as in [31, Proposition 4.2]. Since the Agent does not
see the random variables defined outside of his set of beliefs PA, the Principal is completely free
on the design of the contract on PP . Thus, the Principal can offer a contract which satisfies the
reservation utility constraint on PA and which attains asymptotically her maximal utility on PP .
By doing this the Principal cancels all her risk. This situation is not realistic, since a Principal
should not hire an Agent with a completely different point of view on the market behaviour.
4.4 The Principal’s problem with common believes.
We now turn to a more realistic situation and we study the problem when PA ∩ PP 6= ∅. In this
case, as showed in [31, Proposition 4.3], (4.4) becomes
UP0 = sup
Y0∈Y0
UP0 (Y0), (4.6)
with the abuse of notation
UP0 (Y0) := sup
(Z,K)∈KY0
inf
(P,ν)∈N
α⋆(X)
P ∩N
α⋆(X)
A
EP
[
UP
(
L(XT )− U
−1
A (Y
Y0,Z,K
T )
)]
, (4.7)
with X = U−1A (Y
Y0,Z,K
T ).
4.4.1 A natural restriction to piece-wise constant controls
As explained in [38], then in [13, 14], the problem (4.7) coincides with the weak formulation of a
(non standard) zero-sum stochastic differential game with the following characteristics
• control variables: (Z,K) ∈ KY0 for the Principal and (P, ν) ∈ N
α⋆(X )
P ∩ N
α⋆(X )
A for the
Nature,
• state variables: the output process Xx,Θ and the continuation utility of the Agent Y y,Θ, with
dynamic given for any t ≤ s ≤ T , P− a.s., by

Xt,x,Θs = x+
∫ s
t
b
(
r,Xt,x,Θr , α
⋆ (X )) , νr
)
dr +
∫ s
t
σ(r,Xt,x,Θr , νr)dW
α⋆(X )
r ,
Y t,y,Θs = y +
∫ s
t
Zr · b
(
r,Xt,x,Θr , α
⋆ (X )) , νr
)
− F ⋆(r,Xt,x,Θr , Y
t,y,Θ
r , Zr, σˆ
2
r )dr
+
∫ s
t
Zr · σ(r,X
t,x,Θ
r , νr)dW
α⋆(X )
r +
∫ s
t
dKr,
(4.8)
with Θ ≡ (Z,K, ν) and X = U−1A (Y
Y0,Z,K
T ).
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We now fix an arbitrary Y0 ∈ Y0 and turn to the procedure to solve (4.7). The main issue is that
the class of controls KY0 is too general since, as explained in [31, Section 4.3.2] and [13, 14], the
non-decreasing process K impacts the dynamic of Y Y0,Z,K only throught the minimality condition
(3.3) and more information on this process is required to solve the problem. As emphasized in [39,
Remark 3.4], we need to consider piecewise controls and restrict our investigation on elementary
strategies. This issue is intrinsically linked to the fact that we are looking for a zero-sum game
between the Principal and the Nature. We now consider a restricted set of controls piece-wise
constant included in KY0 .
Definition 4.1 (Elementary controls starting at a stopping time). Let t ∈ [0, T ] and τ a stopping
time Gts-adapted for any s ∈ [t, T ]. We say that an R
d × R+-valued process (Z,K) (resp. ν ∈ N)
is an elementary control starting at τ for the Principal (resp. the Nature) if there exist
• a finite sequence (τi)0≤i≤n of Ft-adapted stopping times such that
τ = τ0 ≤ · · · ≤ τn = T,
• a sequence (zi, ki)1≤i≤n of R
d×R+-valued random variables such that zi, ki are F
t
τi−1
−measurable
and
Zt =
n∑
i=1
zi1τi−1<t≤τi , Kt =
n∑
i=1
ki1τi−1<t≤τi ,
resp. a sequence (ni)1≤i≤n of N -valued random variables such that ni is F
t
τi−1
−measurable
and
νt =
n∑
i=1
ni1τi−1<t≤τi .
We denote by U(t, τ) (resp. V(t, τ)) the set of elementary controls of the Principal (resp. the
Nature). If τ = t = 0, we just write U (resp. V).
We now set
UY0 := KY0 ∩ U ,
and for any (Z,K) ∈ UY0
VY0,Z,K :=
{
(P, ν) ∈ N
α⋆(X )
P ∩ N
α⋆(X )
A
∣∣∣ν ∈ V} .
We thus consider the following restricted problem
V P0 = sup
Y0∈Y0
V P0 (Y0), (4.9)
with the abuse of notation
V P0 (Y0) := sup
(Z,K)∈UY0
inf
(P,ν)∈VY0,Z,K
EP
[
UP
(
L(XT )− U
−1
A (Y
Y0,Z,K
T )
)]
. (4.10)
The literature, an more particularly [39, 34, 41], leads us to expect to get UP0 = V
P
0 for particular
cases in view of the related papers dealing with this kind of problems. In other words, in some
cases, the value of the general problem (4.6) coincides with its restriction (4.9) to piecewise de-
fined controls. We thus will focus on the restricted problem (4.9) in the following, that we solve
completely.
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4.4.2 The intuitive HJBI equation
Assumption (PPD) in [31] seems to be too complicated to prove5 for a general class of processes
K, since it requires a deep study of the measurability of the dynamic version of the value function
associated with the problem (4.9). To avoid this difficulty linked directly to the ambiguity on the
volatility of the model, we will deal with the so-called Perron’s method by following the same ideas
as in [1, 3, 2, 39]. Recall that if one aims at associating (4.7) with an HJBI equation, as usual
in the stochastic control theory, the problem seems to be ill-posed and we need more information
on the process K. We thus expect to have an optimal contract ξ := U−1A (Y
Y0,Z,K
T ) for which the
process K is absolutely continuous. More exactly, and by following [14, Remark 5.1] we expect to
get an optimal contract in a the subspace of contracts for which there exists a GNA-predictable
process Γ with values in Md,d(R) such that
Kt =
∫ t
0
(
F ⋆(s, Ys, Zs, σ̂
2
s) +
1
2
Tr
(
σ̂2sΓs
)
−H(s,Xs, Ys, Zs,Γs)
)
ds. (4.11)
This intuition leads us to set the following Hamiltonian function G : [0, T ] × Rd × R × Rd × R ×
Sd,d × R× Rd −→ R defined by
G(t, x, y, p, p˜, q, q˜, r) := sup
(z,γ)∈Rd×Md,d(R)
inf
n∈N
g(t, x, y, p, p˜, q, q˜, r, z, γ, n),
where
g(t, x, y, p, p˜, q, q˜, r, z, γ, n) := p · b(t, x, α⋆(t, x, y, z, σ̂t), n) +
1
2
Tr
(
σ(t, x, n)σ(t, x, n)⊤q
)
+ p˜
(
1
2
Tr
(
σ(t, x, n)σ(t, x, n)⊤γ
)
−H(t, x, y, z, γ)
)
+ p˜ b(t, x, α⋆(t, x, y, z, σ̂t), n) · z + Tr
(
z⊤σ(t, x, n)σ(t, x, n)⊤r
)
+
1
2
q˜ Tr
(
z⊤σ(t, x, n)σ(t, x, n)⊤z
)
.
We can now set the HJBI equation which is hopefully strongly connected to the problem of the
Principal (4.10){
−∂tu(t, x, y) −G(t, x, y,∇xu, ∂yu,∆xxu, ∂yyu,∇xyu) = 0, (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T )× R
d × R
u(T, x, y) = UP (L(x)− U
−1
A (y)).
(4.12)
4.4.3 Reduction to bounded controls
In this section, we study a fundamental property on the Hamiltonian G appearing in the HJBI
equation (4.12), in order to simplify the study of the stochastic control problem (4.10). The main
difficulty is that the set of controls is unbounded, which can be quite hard to investigate in practice.
We thus set an assumption ensuring that the supremum over (z, γ) in the definition of G can be
reduced to a supremum over a compact set. We show that this assumption holds both for a risk-
neutral setting and in the one dimensional case, i.e. by assuming that d = n = 1, with additional
growth conditions on the data b and σ. The reduction of the set of controls is fundamental in the
proof of Theorem 4.1 below.
5Another approach not considered in this paper, may consist in proving a weak dynamic programming principle
by following [7, 4].
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Assumption 4.2. For fixed p˜, q˜, r ∈ R and for every (t, x, y, p, q) ∈ [0, T ] × R there exists a
continuous radius R := R(t, x, y, p, q) such that
G(t, x, y, p, p˜, q, q˜, r) = sup
|z|≤R
sup
|γ|≤R
inf
n∈N
g(t, x, y, p, p˜, q, q˜, r, z, γ, n).
Example 1: Risk-neutral Principal and risk-neutral Agent without discount factor.
Assume that both the Principal and the Agent are risk-neutral, i.e. UP (x) = UA(x) = x. We
moreover assume that k ≡ 0. In this setting, the worst–case measures of both parties coincide,
and the problem reduces to a classical drift–control model in the Principal–Agent literature. In
fact, the continuation utility of the Principal at time t is given by
uPt (x, y) := sup
(Z,K)∈KY0
inf
(P,ν)∈N
α⋆(X)
P ∩N
α⋆(X)
A
EP
[
L(Xt,x,ΘT )− Y
t,y,Θ
T
]
,
with x ∈ Rd and y ∈ R respectively. Since k ≡ 0, it is clear from the system (4.8) that ut is linear
with respect to the variable y. Roughly speaking, the Hamiltonian G in HJBI equation (4.12) is
evaluated at p˜ = −1 and q˜ = r = 0. Then we have
G(t, x, y, p,−1, q, 0, 0) = sup
(z,γ)
inf
n∈N
(
p · b(t, x, α⋆, n) +
1
2
Tr
(
σσ(t, x, n)⊤q
)
+H(t, x, y, z, γ) −
1
2
Tr
(
σσ(t, x, n)⊤γ
)
− b(t, x, α⋆, n) · z
)
≤ sup
(z,γ)
inf
n∈N
(
p · b(t, x, α⋆, n) +
1
2
Tr
(
σσ(t, x, n)⊤q
)
− c(t, x, α⋆)
)
≤H(t, x, y, p, q).
And evaluating the supremum at z = p and γ = q we obtain the converse inequality
G(t, x, y, p,−1, q, 0, 0) ≥ H(t, x, y, p, q).
It follows that the optimal controls are z⋆ = p, γ⋆ = q and the the infimum is attained for both
H and G at the same optimal n denoted by ν⋆. The continuous radius in this case is given by
R(t, x, y, p, q) = max{|p|, |q|}.
Remark 4.2. In the risk–neutral problem, an important consequence of the Principal and the
Agent having the same worst–case measures is that the the first–best value can be attained. This
is a direct consequence, and an extension, of the well known result in the classical drift–control
problem.
Example 2: One dimensional case. Assume that d = n = 1. The following assumption on
the relative growth of the drift b, the volatility σ and the discount factor k of the output ensures
the existence of the continuous radius.
Assumption 4.3. b and σ are continuous functions which satisfy the following properties.
1. For every (t, x, a) ∈ [0, T ]×R×A and for every ν global minimum of σ(t, x, ·), the following
limits are finite
lim
n→ν
b(t, x, a, n) − b(t, x, a, ν)
σ(t, x, n)− σ(t, x, ν)
, lim
n→ν
k(t, x, a, n) − k(t, x, a, ν)
σ(t, x, n)− σ(t, x, ν)
.
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2. For every (t, x, a) ∈ [0, T ]×R×A and for every ν global maximum of σ(t, x, ·), the following
limit is finite
lim
n→ν
b(t, x, a, n) − b(t, x, a, ν)
σ(t, x, n) − σ(t, x, ν)
, lim
n→ν
k(t, x, a, ν) − k(t, x, a, ν)
σ(t, x, n)− σ(t, x, ν)
.
The proof of the lemma below is postponed to the Appendix C.
Lemma 4.1. Let Assumption 4.3 be satisfied. In addition, assume that n 7→ σ(t, x, n) has a
unique minimizer for every (t, x) and a 7→ F (t, x, y, z, a, n) has a unique maximizer for every
(t, x, y, z, n). Then for any q˜ < 0 and for every (t, x, y, u, p, p˜, q, r) ∈ [0, T ] × R7 Assumption 4.2
holds.
4.4.4 Perron’s method to solve the Principal problem
We now focus on a deep study of PDE (4.12). We assume that b and σ are continuous functions
and that Assumption 4.2 holds.
In this section we drop the assumptions made in [31] and we prove a verification result for a non-
smooth value function, by following the Stochastic Perron’s method introduced by Bayraktar and
Sîrbu [1, 3, 2, 39]. More precisely, we show that the value function of the Principal associated with
the problem (4.10) is a viscosity solution to the HJBI equation (4.12). The approach we follow
avoids to prove (or assume) a dynamic programming principle and only deals with comparison
results. Moreover, the dynamic programming principle is a consequence of the used method. We
adapt now the definition of stochastic semi-solutions to stochastic differential games [39] to our
framework under the weak formulation.
Definition 4.2 (Stopping rule). For t ∈ [0, T ], let (X,Y ) be the canonical process on C
(
[t, T ] ,Rd+1
)
.
Define the filtration Bt = (Bts)t≤s≤T by
Bts := σ((X(u), Y (u)), t ≤ u ≤ s), t ≤ s ≤ T.
τ ∈ C
(
[t, T ] ,Rd+1
)
is a stopping rule starting at t if it is a stopping time with respect to Bt.
Definition 4.3 (Stochastic semisolutions of the HJBI equation). Let Y0 ∈ Y0.
• A function v : [0, T ] × Rd × R −→ R is a stochastic sub-solution of HJBI equation (4.12) if
(i-) v is continuous and v(T, x, y) ≤ UP (L(x)− U
−1
A (y)) for any (x, y) ∈ R
d × R,
(ii-) for any t ∈ [0, T ] and for any stopping rule τ ∈ Bt, there exists an elementary control
(Z˜, K˜) ∈ UY0(t, τ) such that for any (Z,K) ∈ UY0(t, t), any (P, ν) ∈ VY0(t, t) and each
stopping rule ρ ∈ Bt with τ ≤ ρ ≤ T we have
v(τ ′,Xτ ′ , Yτ ′) ≤ E
P
[
v(ρ′,Xρ′ , Yρ′)
∣∣F tτ ′] , P− a.s., (4.13)
where for any (x, y, ω) ∈ R2 × Ω,
X := Xt,x,(Z,K)⊗τ (Z˜,K˜),ν , Y := Y t,y,(Z,K)⊗τ (Z˜,K˜),ν ,
τ ′(ω) := τ(X
t,x,(Z,K)⊗τ (Z˜,K˜),ν
· (ω), Y
t,y,(Z,K)⊗τ (Z˜,K˜),ν
· (ω)),
ρ′(ω) := ρ(X
t,x,(Z,K)⊗ρ(Z˜,K˜),ν
· (ω), Y
t,y,(Z,K)⊗τ (Z˜,K˜),ν
· (ω)).
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We denote by V− the set of stochastic sub-solution of (4.12).
• A function v : [0, T ]×Rd×R −→ R is a stochastic super-solution of HJBI equation (4.12) if
(i+) v is continuous and v(T, x, y) ≥ UP (L(x)− U
−1
A (y)) for any (x, y) ∈ R
d × R
(ii+) for any t ∈ [0, T ], for any stopping rule τ ∈ Bt and for any (Z,K) ∈ UY0(t, t), there
exists an elementary control (Pˆ, ν˜) ∈ VY0(t, τ) such that for every ν ∈ V(t, t) satisfying
(Pˆ, ν) ∈ VY0(t, t) and every stopping rule ρ ∈ B
t with τ ≤ ρ ≤ T we have
v(τ ′,Xτ ′ , Yτ ′) ≥ E
Pˆ
[
v(ρ′,Xρ′ , Yρ′)
∣∣F tτ ′] , Pˆ− a.s., (4.14)
where for any (x, y, ω) ∈ R2 × Ω,
X := Xt,x,Z,K,ν⊗τ ν˜ , Y := Y t,x,Z,K,ν⊗τ ν˜ ,
τ ′(ω) := τ(Xt,x,Z,K,ν⊗τ ν˜· (ω), Y
t,x,Z,K,ν⊗τ ν˜
· (ω)),
ρ′(ω) := ρ(Xt,x,Z,K,ν⊗τ ν˜· (ω), Y
t,x,Z,K,ν⊗τ ν˜
· (ω)).
We denote by V+ the set of stochastic super-solution of (4.12).
To apply Perron’s method we need the following assumption, assuring the existence of stochastic
semi-solutions to the HJBI equation (4.12) (see Assumptions 3.4 and 4.3 in [2]).
Assumption 4.4. The sets V+ and V− are non-empty.
As explained in [1, 3] the set V+ is trivially non empty if the function UP is bounded by above,
whereas V− is non empty if UP is bounded by below.
Now we follow the stochastic Perron’s method proposed in [39]. Let us define
v− := sup
v∈V−
v, v+ := inf
v∈V+
v,
and notice that we have from Definition 4.3 that for any Y0 ∈ Y0
v−(0, x, Y0) ≤ V
P
0 (Y0) ≤ v
+(0, x, Y0). (4.15)
We thus get the main theorem of this section and we refer to the Appendix D for the proof.
Theorem 4.1. v− is a lower semi-continuous viscosity super-solution of HJBI equation (4.12)
and v+ is an upper semi-continuous viscosity sub-solution of HJBI equation (4.12).
Moreover, if there exists a comparison result for HJBI equation (4.12), i.e. for any lower semi-
continuous viscosity sub-solution v and for any upper semi-continuous viscosity super-solution v,
we have
sup
[0,T ]×Rd×R
(v − v) = sup
Rd×R
(v(T, ·) − v(T, ·)),
then
v−(0, x, Y0) = V
P
0 (Y0) = v
+(0, x, Y0).
19
4.4.5 On comparison results in the one-dimensional case for bounded diffusions with
quadratic cost.
In general, it seems to be hard to get a comparison result for HJBI equation (4.12) in a very general
model and we are convinced that only a case-by-case approach has to be considered. In this section
we focus on the one–dimensional case, and we illustrate why we can expect a comparison result
for HJBI equation (4.12), when the domain of the equation and the space of controls are bounded.
For a positive real a, let A := [0, a] be the set of values of control α. We assume for technical
reasons detailed below (see the footnote) that UA is a bounded and increasing continuous map. For
M > 0, let ϕM be a smooth function taking values in [0, 1], such that ϕM (x) = 0 for |x| ≥M + 1
and ϕM (x) = 1 for |x| ≤ M . Consider b(t, x, a, n) := aϕM (x) and σ(t, x, n) := nϕM (x). In this
case, recalling [21, Remark 3.1], the output process X takes values in a bounded set OX . We now
turn to the process Y . Assume that c(t, x, a) = a
2
2 . Then, α
⋆(t, x, z) = πA(zϕ
M (x)) where πA
denotes the projective map from R into A. Thus 2BSDE (3.2) becomes
Yt = UA(ξ) +
∫ T
t
f(Xs, Zs)ds −
∫ T
t
Zs · dXs −
∫ T
t
dKs, PA − q.s,
with f(x, z) :=
(
πA(zϕ
M (x))ϕM (x)z − |πA(zϕ
M (x))|2
2
)
. Notice that, due to the vertex property
together with the definition of A, we have
−
|z|2
2
≤ f(x, z) ≤
|z|2
2
.
Inspired by [36, Section 4], we introduce the following purely quadratic 2BSDEs, for ς ∈ {−1, 1}
Y ςt = UA(ξ) +
∫ T
t
ς
|Zςs |
2
2
ds −
∫ T
t
Zςs · dXs −
∫ T
t
dKςs , PA − q.s. (4.16)
Since UA is bounded6, it follows from [36, Proposition 4.1] that the 2BSDEs admit a unique solution
and that there exists a positive constant κY > 0 such that for all t ∈ [0, T ], |Y ςt | is uniformly
bounded by κY . Hence, we deduce from a comparison principle for 2BSDEs with quadratic growth
(see for instance [36, Proposition 3.1]) that |Yt| ≤ maxς∈{−1,1}(|Y
ς
t |) ≤ |κ
Y |, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], P − a.s.
Thus, the continuation utility of the Agent, being a state variable of the problem of the Principal,
is bounded so we can restrict the domain of y in (4.12) to OY := [−κY , κY ].
We have shown that we can restrict the domain of the HJBI equation (4.12) to a bounded domain
OX ×OY . To get now a comparison principle in the sense of Theorem 4.1, we refer to the proof of
Lemma 4.3 in Sîrbu [39]. Indeed, by noticing that the required conditions on the parameters are
evaluated at the test functions (see Step 3 of the proof of Lemma 4.3 in [39]), the continuity of the
radius R in Lemma 4.1 ensures that we can reproduce the proof by choosing a penalisation function
of the form φ(t, x, y) = e−λt(1 + |x|+ ψ(|y|)) where ψ is concave continuously differentiable twice
and positive on OY . Therefore, a comparison theorem for HJBI equation (4.12) can be obtained
and the last part of Theorem 4.1 holds.
6The assumption on UA bounded, instead of UA concave, is fundamental here to get the comparison theorem. In
fact, for quadratic growth BSDE we have to assume the the generator is convex together with exponential moments
for the terminal conditions (see [8]). As far as we now this kind of result does not exist for quadratic 2BSDE, we
however think that UA bounded could be removed by adding finite exponential moments for UA(ξ) in the definition
of C.
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5 Conclusion
In this work we provide a general comprehensive methodology for Principal-Agent problems with
volatility uncertainty and worst-case approach from both sides in a general framework. We char-
acterize the value function of the Agent as the solution to a second–order BSDE. Concerning the
problem of the Principal, we rewrite it as a non–standard stochastic differential game that we solve
by using Perron’s method inspiring by the work of Sîrbu [39]. In this work we extend
• [31] by dropping all the technical assumptions needed and with more general models,
• [44] by considering general utilities for both the Agent and the Principal in a more general
model without any restrictions on the form of the contracts.
This work is also a complement of
• [14] by considering an uncertainty on the set of probabilities so that the problem of the
Principal is more difficult to solve,
• [39] by adding a Stackelberg equilibrium in the stochastic game.
To provide a path for future research, we would like to point that [31] has solved a particular non-
learning model explicitly. Although this assumption allows to get nice closed formula for optimal
contracts, it is clearly not realistic at all that the ambiguity set is fixed. In the present paper, we
assume that the ambiguity set can evolve along the time but we do not specify how it evolves. An
interesting extension to this work might be to add in the problem an adaptive method, inspired
by the recent paper [6], to update the ambiguity set. Indeed, we are convinced that a learning
procedure will lead to sharper estimates of the unknown volatility process and that the ambiguity
may become negligible after some time.
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A Functional spaces
We finally introduce the spaces used in this paper, by following [35]. Let t ∈ [0, T ] and x ∈ Ω and
a family (P(t, x))t∈[0,T ]×x∈Ω of sets of probability measures on (Ω,FT ). In this section, we denote
by X := (Xs)s∈[0,T ] a general filtration on (Ω,FT ). For any XT−measurable real valued random
variable ξ such that supP∈P(t,x) E
P[|ξ|] < +∞, we set for any s ∈ [t, T ]
EP,t,x,X
+
s [ξ] := ess sup
P
P′∈P(t,x)[P,X+,t]
EP
′
[ξ|Xs].
Let p ≥ 1 and P ∈ P(t, x) and XP the usual P-augmented filtration associated with X.
• Let κ ∈ [1, p], Lp,κt,x (X,P) denotes the space of XT−measurable R−valued random variables
ξ such that
‖ξ‖p
L
p,κ
t,x (X,P)
:= sup
P∈P(t,x)
EP
[
ess supP
t≤s≤T
(
EP,t,x,F
+
s [|ξ|
κ]
) p
κ
]
< +∞.
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• Hpt,x(X,P) denotes the spaces of X-predictable R
d-valued processes Z such that
‖Z‖p
H
p
t,x(X,P)
:= EP
[(∫ T
t
‖σ̂
1
2
s Zs‖
2ds
) p
2
]
< +∞.
We denote by Hpt,x(X,P) the spaces of X-predictable R
d-valued processes Z such that
‖Z‖p
H
p
t,x(X,P)
:= sup
P∈P(t,x)
‖Z‖p
H
p
t,x(P)
< +∞.
• Spt,x(X,P) denotes the spaces of X-progressively measurable R-valued processes Y such that
‖Y ‖p
S
p
t,x(X,P)
:= EP
[
sup
s∈[t,T ]
|Ys|
p
]
< +∞.
We denote by Spt,x(X,P) of X-progressively measurable R-valued processes Y such that
‖Y ‖p
S
p
t,x(X,P)
:= sup
P∈P(t,x)
‖Y ‖p
S
p
t,x(P)
< +∞.
• Kpt,x(X,P) denotes the spaces of X-optional R-valued processes K with P−a.s. càdlàg and
non-decreasing paths on [t, T ] with Kt = 0, P− a.s. and
‖K‖p
K
p
t,x(X,P)
:= EP
[
K
p
T
]
< +∞.
We denote by Kpt,x((XP)P∈P(t,x)) the set of families of processes (K
P)P∈P(t,x) such that for
any P ∈ P(t, x), KP ∈ Kpt,x(XP,P) and
sup
P∈P(t,x)
‖KP‖Kpt,x(P) < +∞.
• Mpt,x(X,P) denotes the spaces of X-optional R-valued martingales M with P−a.s. càdlàg
paths on [t, T ] with Mt = 0, P− a.s. and
‖M‖p
M
p
t,x(X,P)
:= EP
[
[M ]
p
2
T
]
< +∞.
We denote by Mpt,x((XP)P∈P(t,x)) the set of families of processes (M
P)P∈P(t,x) such that for
any P ∈ P(t, x), MP ∈Mpt,x(XP,P) and
sup
P∈P(t,x)
‖MP‖Mpt,x(P) < +∞.
When t = 0 we simplify the previous notations by omitting the dependence on x.
B Proofs for the Agent’s problem
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Since ℓ+m
m+1−ℓ ≤ 2, we have from Lemma 3.1 that the 2BSDE (3.2) has
quadratic growth with respect to z and coincide with the framework of [36]. In view of Re-
mark 4.2 in [35], we aim at applying Theorem 4.1 in [35] by slightly changing its assumptions.
More precisely, we replace (i) of Assumption 2.1 in [35] by Assumption 2.1 in [36], excepting part
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(iii). Condition (iv) in [36] is a consequence of Lemma 3.1. Conditions (v)-(vi) in [36] holds in our
setting because k is bounded. Therefore, Assumption 2.1 in [36] is satisfied.
Finally, we turn to parts (ii)–(v) of Assumption 2.1 in [35]. The terminal condition UA(ξ) belongs
to Lp,κ0,x(PA) by definition of the admissible contracts and the conditions imposed on c in (H
ℓ,m,m)
ensure that (ii) holds. The parts (iii), (iv) and (v) correspond exactly to our Assumption 2.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. We first prove that (3.4) holds with a characterization of the optimal effort
of the Agent as a maximizer of the 2BSDE (3.2). The proof is divided in 4 steps.
• Step 1: For every (α, ν) ∈ A×V(σˆ2) denote by (Y α,ν , Zα,ν ,Kα,ν) the solution of the follow-
ing controlled 2BSDE, defined PA − q.s. (well-posedness holds by the same arguments employed
in the proof of Lemma 3.2)
Y
α,ν
t = UA(ξ)+
∫ T
t
F (s,X, Y α,νs , Z
α,ν
s , αs, νs)ds−
∫ T
t
Zα,νs ·dXs−
∫ T
t
dKα,νs −
∫ T
0
dMα,νs . (B.1)
Consider also, for every α ∈ A, the solution (Y α, Zα,Kα) of the following 2BSDE, defined PA−q.s.
Y αt = UA(ξ)+
∫ T
t
inf
ν∈Vs(x,σˆ2s)
F (s,X, Y αs , Z
α
s , αs, ν)ds−
∫ T
t
Zαs · dXs−
∫ T
t
dKαs −
∫ T
0
dMαs . (B.2)
We have from comparison theorems for 2BSDEs (which are inherited by the classical comparison
results for BSDEs)
Y0 = ess sup
P
α∈A
Y α0 , P− a.s. for every P ∈ PA
= ess supP
α∈A
ess infP
ν∈V(σˆ2)
Y
α,ν
0 , P− a.s. for every P ∈ PA. (B.3)
• Step 2: Next, consider for any P ∈ PA the triple (Y
P,α,ν
t ,Z
P,α,ν
t ,M
P,α,ν
t )t∈[0,T ] which is the
solution of the (well-posed) linear BSDE
YP,α,ν0 = UA(ξ) +
∫ T
0
F (s,X,YP,α,νs ,Z
P,α,ν
s , αs, νs)ds−
∫ T
0
ZP,α,νs · dXs −
∫ T
0
dMP,α,νs , P− a.s.
(B.4)
We will follow the idea of Theorem 4.2 in [35], to prove that for every (α, ν) ∈ A × V(σˆ2), the
solution of the 2BSDE (B.1) satisfies the following representation
Y
α,ν
0 = ess inf
P
P′∈PA[P,F+,0]
YP
′,α,ν
0 , P− a.s. for every P ∈ PA. (B.5)
First, notice that since Kα,ν is non-decreasing, we have for every P ∈ PA and P′ ∈ PA[P,F+, 0]
Y
α,ν
0 ≤ Y
P′,α,ν
0 , P− a.s.
thus
Y
α,ν
0 ≤ ess inf
P
P′∈PA[P,F+,0]
YP
′,α,ν
0 , P− a.s. for every P ∈ PA.
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To the reverse inequality, compute for every P ∈ PA
YP,α,νt − Y
α,ν
t =
∫ T
t
(
F (s,X,YP,α,νs ,Z
P,α,ν
s , αs, νs)− F (s,X, Y
α,ν
s , Z
α,ν
s , αs, νs)
)
ds
−
∫ T
t
(
ZP,α,νs − Z
α,ν
s
)
· dXs +
∫ T
t
dKα,νs −
∫ T
t
(
dMP,α,νs − dM
α,ν
s
)
,P− a.s.
Which is equivalent to
YP,α,νt − Y
α,ν
t =
∫ T
t
(
−k(s,X, αs, νs)(Y
P,α,ν
s − Y
α,ν
s ) + b(s,X, αs)
(
ZP,α,νs − Z
α,ν
s
))
ds
−
∫ T
t
(
ZP,α,νs − Z
α,ν
s
)
· dXs +
∫ T
t
dKα,νs −
∫ T
t
(
dMP,α,νs − dM
α,ν
s
)
,P− a.s.
Using a linearization (see for instance [17]), we get
YP,α,ν0 − Y
α,ν
0 = E
Pα
[∫ T
0
Kα,ν0,s dK
α,ν
s
∣∣∣∣∣ F0
]
, P− a.s.
Then, from Assumption (Hℓ,m,m) (iii) we deduce that
YP,α,ν0 − Y
α,ν
0 ≥ e
−κTEP
α
[∫ T
0
dKα,νs
∣∣∣∣∣ F0
]
, P− a.s.
Since Kα,ν satisfies the minimality condition (3.3), we deduce that YP,α,ν0 − Y
α,ν
0 ≥ 0, P− a.s. for
every P ∈ PA and (B.5) holds.
• Step 3: Finally, by denoting cαs := c(s,X, αs), k
α,ν
s = k(s,X, αs, νs), b
α,ν
s = b(s,X, αs, νs),
we can rewrite the BSDE (B.4) P− a.s. as
YP,α,ν0 = UA(ξ) +
∫ T
0
(
−kα,νs Y
P,α,ν
s − c
α
s + Z
P,α,ν
s · b
α,ν
s
)
ds−
∫ T
0
ZP,α,νs · dXs −
∫ T
0
dMP,α,νs .
Which is equivalent to
YP,α,ν0 = UA(ξ) +
∫ T
0
(
−kα,νs Y
P,α,ν
s − c
α
s + (σ
ν
s )
⊤ZP,α,νs · (σ
ν
s )
⊤
(
σνsσ
ν⊤
s
)−1
bα,νs
)
ds
−
∫ T
0
(σνs )
⊤ZP,α,νs · dW
P
s −
∫ T
0
dMP,α,νs .
Defining ZˆP,α,νs = (σνs )
⊤ZP,α,νs , we obtain
YP,α,ν0 = UA(ξ) +
∫ T
0
(
−kα,νs Y
P,α,ν
s − c
α
s + Zˆ
P,α,ν
s · (σ
ν
s )
⊤
(
σνsσ
ν⊤
s
)−1
bα,νs
)
ds
−
∫ T
0
ZˆP,α,νs · dW
P
s −
∫ T
0
dMP,α,νs ,
whose solution is
YP,α,ν0 = E
Pα,ν
[
Kα,ν0,TUA(ξ)−
∫ T
0
Kα,ν0,s c
α
s ds
∣∣∣∣∣ F0
]
, P− a.s.,
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where the measure Pα,ν is equivalent to P and is defined by
dPα,ν
dP
:= E
(∫ T
0
σ⊤(σσ⊤)−1(s,X, νs)b(s,X, αs, νs) · dW
P
s
)
.
• Step 4: We have from the previous steps that the measure Pα,ν ∈ PαA and for every measure
P ∈ PA we have P-a.s.
Y0 = ess sup
P
α∈A
ess infP
ν∈V(σˆ2)
ess infP
P′∈PA[P,F+,0]
EP
′α,ν
[
Kα,ν0,TUA(ξ)−
∫ T
0
Kα,ν0,s c
α
s ds
∣∣∣∣∣ F0
]
= ess supP
α∈A
ess infP
(P′,ν)∈NαA [P,F
+,0]
EP
′
[
Kα,ν0,TUA(ξ)−
∫ T
0
Kα,ν0,s c
α
s ds
∣∣∣∣∣ F0
]
.
By similar arguments to the ones used in the proofs of Lemma 3.5 and Theorem 5.2 of [35], it
follows that
sup
α∈A
inf
(P,ν)∈NαA
EP [Y0] = sup
α∈A
inf
(P,ν)∈NαA
EP
[
K0,TUA(ξ)−
∫ T
0
K0,sc
α
s ds
]
= UA0 (ξ).
We now turn to the second part of the Theorem with the characterization of an optimal triplet
(α,P, ν) for the optimization problem (3.4). From the proof of the first part, it is clear that a
control (α⋆,P⋆, ν⋆) is optimal if and only if it attains all the essential suprema and infima above.
The infimum in (B.5) is attained if (ii) holds and equality (B.3) holds if α⋆ and ν⋆ satisfy (i).
C Proof of Lemma 4.1
The proof of Lemma 4.1 is based on the following Lemma.
Lemma C.1. Let σ : [c, d]→ R be continuous, strictly positive and let q : [c, d]→ R be continuous.
Define for every γ ∈ R the map fγ(x) := γσ(x)
2 − q(x).
1. Let x be a minimizer of σ, which maximizes q between all the minimizers of σ. If the following
limit is finite
ℓ := lim
x→x
q(x)− q(x)
σ(x) − σ(x)
,
then there exists M > 0 such that fγ attains its minimum over [c, d] at x for every γ > M .
2. Let x be a maximizer of σ, which minimizes q between all the maximizers of σ. If the following
limit is finite
L := lim
x→x
q(x)− q(x)
σ(x) − σ(x)
,
then there exists m < 0 such that fγ attains its minimum over [c, d] at x for every γ < m.
Proof. 1. We suppose without loss of generality that σ attains its minimum over [c, d] at a
unique point x. Define g : [c, d]→ R by
g(x) =
{
q(x)−q(x)
σ(x)−σ(x) , x 6= x,
ℓ, x = x.
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We have that g is continuous on [c, d] and therefore there exists Mg such that
|g(x)| ≤Mg, ∀x ∈ [c, d].
Then, for every γ > M := Mg2σ(x) we have
γ >
q(x)− q(x)
2σ(x)(σ(x)− σ(x))
, ∀x ∈ [c, d], x 6= x,
⇐⇒ γ · 2σ(x)(σ(x) − σ(x)) > q(x)− q(x), ∀x ∈ [c, d], x 6= x,
=⇒γ(σ(x) + σ(x))(σ(x) − σ(x)) > q(x)− q(x), ∀x ∈ [c, d], x 6= x,
⇐⇒ γσ(x)2 − q(x) > γσ(x)2 − q(x), ∀x ∈ [c, d], x 6= x.
2. We suppose without loss of generality that σ attains its maximum over [c, d] at a unique
point x. Define G : [c, d]→ R by
G(x) =
{
q(x)−q(x)
σ(x)−σ(x) , x 6= x,
L, x = x.
We have that G is continuous on [c, d] and therefore there exists MG such that
|G(x)| ≤MG, ∀x ∈ [c, d].
Then, for every γ < m := − MG2σ(x) we have
γ <
q(x)− q(x)
2σ(x)(σ(x)− σ(x))
, ∀x ∈ [c, d], x 6= x,
⇐⇒ γ · 2σ(x)(σ(x)− σ(x)) < q(x)− q(x), ∀x ∈ [c, d], x 6= x,
=⇒γ(σ(x) + σ(x))(σ(x)− σ(x)) < q(x)− q(x), ∀x ∈ [c, d], x 6= x,
⇐⇒ γσ(x)2 − q(x) < γσ(x)2 − q(x), ∀x ∈ [c, d], x 6= x.
Proof of Lemma 4.1.
(a) If q˜ < 0, the boundedness of b and σ, together with Lemma 3.1 makes g coercive in z and the
supremum in this variable can be restricted to a compact. The property on γ is independent of
the sign of q˜ and is presented next. Recall the Hamiltonian
H(t, x, y, z, γ) = sup
a∈A
inf
n∈N
{
1
2
γσ(t, x, n)2 − k(t, x, a, n)y − c(t, x, a) + b(t, x, a, n)z
}
.
It follows from Lemma C.1 the existence of m,M ∈ R such that if γ > M then the infimum in H
is attained at the minimizer ν of σ(t, x, ·) and if γ < m then the infimum in H is attained at the
maximizer ν of σ(t, x, ·).
Suppose now that p˜ > 0. It follows again from Lemma C.1, that for γ big enough, the infimum
in G is attained at the minimizer ν. For γ negative enough, the infimum in G is attained at the
maximizer ν. This means that there exists some R := R(t, x, y, u, p, p˜, q, q˜, r) such that G and H
attain its minima at the same value n ∈ N for |γ| > R. Therefore G does not depend on γ and
the supremum on γ can be restricted to the set |γ| ≤ R.
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Suppose finally that p˜ < 0. Then for γ big enough, the infimum in G is attained at the maximizer
ν. For γ small enough, the infimum in G is attained at the minimizer ν. In both cases, the
dependence of G on γ is given by the term p˜|γ|(σ(t, x, ν)2 − σ(t, x, ν)2) so it follows that g is
coercive in γ.
(b) R is continuous as a consequence of the maximum theorem [5]. Indeed, the minimizer and max-
imizer correspondences are upper hemicontinuous and single-valued, therefore they are continuous
functions and R is continuous.
D Proof of Theorem 4.1
The following Lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 4.1. Its proof is omitted, being a path-wise
approximation of deterministic Lebesgue integrals.
Lemma D.1. Define the process K(Z,Γ) by
Kt(Z,Γ) =
∫ t
0
(
F ⋆(s, Ys, Zs, σ̂
2
s) +
1
2
Tr
(
σ̂2sΓs
)
−H(s,Xs, Ys, Zs,Γs)
)
ds. (D.1)
Then, for any bounded map ψ, there exists a sequence kp of elementary controls such that for any
ε > 0 and any p big enough∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
ψsdKs(Z,Γ) −
∫ t
0
ψsdk
p
s
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε, PP − q.s. (D.2)
Proof of Theorem 4.1
The proof follows the ideas of [39]. Intuitively, V0 has to be greater than v− since v− is roughly
speaking the HJBI equation associated with the problem of the Principal whenK has the particular
decomposition (4.11). In other words, the value of the unrestricted problem for the Principal has
to be a super-solution of such HJBI equation.
Step 1. v− is a viscosity super-solution of (4.12).
We prove that v− is a viscosity super-solution of (4.12) by contradiction.
1. The viscosity supersolution property on [0, T )
a. Setting the contradiction. Let ϕ be some map from [0, T ] × Rd × R −→ R con-
tinuously differentiable in time and twice continuously differentiable in space. Let
(t0, x0, y0) ∈ [0, T ) × R
d × R be such that v− − ϕ attains a strict local minimum equal
to 0 at this point. We assume (by contradiction) that
∂tϕ(t0, x0, y0) +G(t0, x0, y0, ϕ,∇xϕ, ∂yϕ,∆xxϕ, ∂yyϕ,∇xyϕ) > 0 (D.3)
In particular, there exists some (zˆ, γˆ) ∈ Rd ×Md,d(R) and a small ε > 0 such that
∂tϕ(t0, x0, y0) + inf
n∈N
g(t0, x0, y0, ϕ,∇xϕ, ∂yϕ,∆xxϕ, ∂yyϕ,∇xyϕ, zˆ, γˆ, n) > ε.
Recall that g is continuous and N is a compact subset of some finite dimensional space.
From Heine’s Theorem, we deduce that there exists some ε′ > 0 such that for any
(t, x, y) ∈ B((t0, x0, y0); ε
′) we have
∂tϕ(t, x, y) + inf
n∈N
g(t, x, y, ϕ,∇xϕ, ∂yϕ,∆xxϕ, ∂yyϕ,∇xyϕ, zˆ, γˆ, n) > ε
′. (D.4)
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We denote Tε′ := B((t0, x0, y0); ε′) \ B((t0, x0, y0);
ε′
2 ). On Tε′, we have v
− > ϕ so that
the maximum of ϕ− v− is attained and is negative. Thus, there exists some η > 0 such
that ϕ < v− − η on Tε′. From [39, Lemma 3.8] there exists a non decreasing sequence
wn in V− converging to v−. Then, there exists n0 ≥ 1 such that for any n ≥ n0 large
enough, ϕ+ η2 < wn on Tε′ . We denote by wn0+ such wn. Thus, for 0 < δ <
η
2 we define
wδ :=
{
(ϕ+ δ) ∨wn0+, on B((t0, x0, y0); ε
′),
wn0+, outside B((t0, x0, y0); ε
′).
Notice that
wδ(t0, x0, y0) = (ϕ(t0, x0, y0) + δ) ∨ wn0+(t0, x0, y0)
≥ ϕ(t0, x0, y0) + δ
> v−(t0, x0, y0). (D.5)
Thus proving that wδ ∈ V− provides the desired contradiction. From now, we fix some
t ∈ [0, T ] and τ ∈ Bt. We need to build a strategy (Z˜, K˜) ∈ UY0(t, τ) such that Property
(ii−) in Definition 4.3 holds. Recall that wn0+ ∈ V
−, thus there exists some elementary
strategy (Z˜1(τ), K˜1(τ)) ∈ UY0(t, τ) such that Property (ii−) in Definition 4.3 holds.
b. Building the elementary strategy and Property (ii-) We consider the following
strategy that we denote by (Z˜ , K˜).
∗ If ϕ + δ > wn0+ at time τ , we choose the strategy (zˆ, kˆ
p(zˆ, γˆ)), where kˆp(zˆ, γˆ) is
such that inequality (D.2) holds with ε2 .
∗ Otherwise we follow the elementary strategy (Z˜1(τ), K˜1(τ)).
Let τ1 be the first time when (t,Xt, Yt) exits from B((t0, x0, y0); ε) (which can be τ
itself). On the boundary of this ball, we know that wδ = wn0+, thus we choose the
strategy (Z˜1(τ1), K˜1(τ1)) ∈ U(t, τ1), coinciding with the strategy associated with wn0+
starting at τ1.
Rigorously speaking, define
Z˜(s, x(·), y(·)) := zˆ1{ϕ(τ(x,y),x(τ(x,y)),y(τ(x,y)))+δ>wn0+(τ(x,y),x(τ(x,y)),y(τ(x,y)))}
+ Z˜1s (τ)1{ϕ(τ(x,y),x(τ(x,y)),y(τ(x,y)))+δ≤wn0+(τ(x,y),x(τ(x,y)),y(τ(x,y)))} ,
K˜(s, x(·), y(·)) := kˆps(zˆ, γˆ)1{ϕ(τ(x,y),x(τ(x,y)),y(τ(x,y)))+δ>wn0+(τ(x,y),x(τ(x,y)),y(τ(x,y)))}
+ K˜1s (τ)1{ϕ(τ(x,y),x(τ(x,y)),y(τ(x,y)))+δ≤wn0+(τ(x,y),x(τ(x,y)),y(τ(x,y)))} ,
and the stopping rule τ1 : C([t, T ],Rd+1) −→ [t, T ] by
τ1(x, y) = inf
τ(x,y)≤s≤T
(s, x(s), y(s)) ∈ ∂B((t0, x0, y0); ε).
Then, we consider the following strategy
Z˜ := Z˜ ⊗τ1 Z˜
1(τ1), K˜ := K˜ ⊗τ1 K˜
1(τ1). (D.6)
From Lemma 2.8 in [39], we have (Z˜, K˜) ∈ U(t, τ). It remains to prove that K˜ satisfies
the minimality condition (3.3) to conclude that the strategy defined by (D.6) is in
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UY0(t, τ). Using a measurability selection argument as in the proof of Theorem 5.3 in
[40], for any ε > 0 there exists a weak solution Pε such that K(zˆ, γˆ) ≤ ε, Pˆε − a.s..
By Lemma D.1, we deduce that for any ε > 0, any p big enough and any t ∈ [0, T ],
|kˆpt (zˆ, γˆ)| ≤ 2ε, Pˆ
ε − a.s. Hence, (Z˜, K˜) ∈ UY0(t, τ).
Fix (Z,K) ∈ UY0(t, t), (P, ν) ∈ VY0(t, t) and ρ a stopping rule in B
t such that τ ≤ ρ ≤ T .
With the notations in Definition 4.3 (ii-), we define the event
A :=
{
ϕ(τ ′,Xτ ′ , Yτ ′) + δ > wn0+(τ
′,Xτ ′ , Yτ ′)
}
.
Applying Ito’s formula to ϕ+ δ on A, and setting σr := σ(r,X
zˆ,kˆp
r , νr), we get for any
t ≤ τ ′ ≤ s′ ≤ s ≤ τ ′1
ϕ(s,X zˆ,kˆ
p
s , Y
zˆ,kˆp
s ) = ϕ(s
′,X
zˆ,kˆp
s′ , Y
zˆ,kˆp
s′ ) +
∫ s
s′
(∇xϕ+ ∂yϕzˆ) · σrdW
⋆
r
+
∫ s
s′
∂tϕ+ g(r,X
zˆ,kˆp
r , Y
zˆ,kˆp
r , ϕ,∇xϕ, ∂yϕ,∆xxϕ, ∂yyϕ,∇xyϕ, zˆ, γˆ, νr)dr
+
∫ s
s′
∂yϕ(r,X
zˆ,kˆp
r , Y
zˆ,kˆp
r )
(
dkˆps − dKr(zˆ, γˆ)
)
.
From Lemma D.1 together with (D.4), we get (for p big enough)
ϕ(s,X zˆ,kˆ
p
s , Y
zˆ,kˆp
s ) > ϕ(s
′,X
zˆ,kˆp
s′ , Y
zˆ,kˆp
s′ ) +
∫ s
s′
(∇xϕ+ ∂yϕzˆ) · σrdW
⋆
r
+ (s− s′)
ε′
2
.
Thus, ϕ is a sub-martingale on [τ, τ1] under P and Property (ii−) is satisfied on [τ ′, τ ′1].
On Ac, wn0+ automatically satisfies Property (ii−). By noticing that for any τ
′ ≤ s ≤ τ ′1
Xt,x,(Z,K)⊗τ (Z˜,K˜),νs = 1AX
t,x,(Z,K)⊗τ (zˆ,kˆp),ν
s + 1AcX
t,x,(Z,K)⊗τ (Z˜1(τ),K˜1(τ)),ν
s ,
using iterated conditioning and by following the same lines in proof 1.1 of Theorem 3.5
in [39], we deduce that wδ ∈ V−, which contradicts (D.5). Thus,
∂tϕ(t0, x0, y0) +G(t0, x0, y0, ϕ,∇xϕ, ∂yϕ,∆xxϕ, ∂yyϕ,∇xyϕ) ≤ 0.
2. The viscosity supersolution property at time T . We now aim at proving that v−(T, x, y) ≥
UP (L(x)−U
−1
A (y)) for any (x, y) ∈ R
d×R. This proof follows the same lines that the step 3
of the proof of Theorem 3.1 in [2] or the proof of Theorem 3.5, 1.2 in [39]. We assume by con-
tradiction that there exists (x0, y0) ∈ Rd×R such that v−(T, x0, y0) < UP (L(x0)−U
−1
A (y0)).
Since UP is continuous, there exists ε > 0 such that
UP (L(x)− U
−1
A (y)) ≥ v
−(T, x, y) + ε, (x, y) ∈ B((x0, y0); ε).
We define Tε := B((T, x0, y0); ε) \ B((T, x0, y0); ε2). Let η > 0 be small enough such that
v−(T, x0, y0) + ε <
ε2
4η
+ inf
(t,x,y)∈Tε
v−(t, x, y).
Thus, using exactly the same Dini type arguments that in [39, 3], there exists n0 big enough
such that for some wn0 ∈ V
− we have
v−(T, x0, y0) + ε <
ε2
4η
+ inf
(t,x,y)∈Tε
wn0(t, x, y).
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We now define for any λ > 0
ϕε,η,λ(t, x, y) := v−(T, x0, y0)−
‖(x, y) − (x0, y0)‖
2
η
− λ(T − t).
By using the result of Lemma 4.1, for some λ > 0 large enough, we get for any (t, x, y) ∈
B((T, x0, y0); ε)
−∂tϕ
ε,η,λ(t, x, y)−G(t, x, y, ϕε,η,λ,∇xϕ
ε,η,λ, ∂yϕ
ε,η,λ,∆xxϕ
ε,η,λ, ∂yyϕ
ε,η,λ,∇xyϕ
ε,η,λ) < 0.
Moreover, such ϕε,η,λ satisfies on Tε
ϕε,η,λ(t, x, y) ≤ v−(T, x0, y0)−
ε2
4η
≤ wn0(t, x, y)− ε,
and on B((x0, y0); ε),
ϕε,η,λ(T, x, y) ≤ v−(T, x, y) ≤ UP (L(x)− U
−1
A (y))− ε.
Thus, for 0 < δ < η2 we define
wε,η,λ,δ :=
{
(ϕε,η,λ + δ) ∨wn0+, on B((T, x0, y0); ε),
wn0+, outside B((T, x0, y0); ε).
The rest of the proof is analogous similar to the step 1, we show that wε,η,λ,δ ∈ V− and
wε,η,λ,δ(T, x0, y0) = v
−(T, x0, y0) + δ
> v−(T, x0, y0),
which leads to a contradiction. We conclude that
v−(T, x, y) ≥ UP (L(x)− U
−1
A (y))
for any (x, y) ∈ Rd × R.
Step 2. v+ is a viscosity sub-solution of (4.12).
We now prove that v+ is a viscosity sub-solution of (4.12) by contradiction.
1. The viscosity subsolution property on [0, T )
a. Setting the contradiction. Let ϕ be some map from [0, T ] × Rd × R −→ R con-
tinuously differentiable in time and twice continuously differentiable in space. Let
(t0, x0, y0) ∈ [0, T ) × R
d × R be such that v+ − ϕ attains a strict local maximum
equal to 0 at this point. We assume (by contradiction) that
∂tϕ(t0, x0, y0) +G(t0, x0, y0, ϕ,∇xϕ, ∂yϕ,∆xxϕ, ∂yyϕ,∇xyϕ) < 0 (D.7)
Then, for any (z, γ) ∈ Rd ×Md,d(R), we have
∂tϕ(t0, x0, y0) + inf
n∈N
g(t0, x0, y0, ϕ,∇xϕ, ∂yϕ,∆xxϕ, ∂yyϕ,∇xyϕ, z, γ, n) < 0.
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Therefore, there exists ε > 0 and νˆ(z, γ) ∈ N such that
∂tϕ(t0, x0, y0) + g(t0, x0, y0, ϕ,∇xϕ, ∂yϕ,∆xxϕ, ∂yyϕ,∇xyϕ, z, γ, νˆ(z, γ)) < −ε.
Using the continuity of our applications, we deduce that on B((t0, x0, y0); ε) we have,
for a small ε′ > 0,
∂tϕ(t, x, y) + g(t, x, y, ϕ,∇xϕ, ∂yϕ,∆xxϕ, ∂yyϕ,∇xyϕ, z, γ, νˆ(z, γ)) < −ε
′.
We denote Tε′ := B((t0, x0, y0); ε′) \ B((t0, x0, y0);
ε′
2 ). On Tε′, we have v
+ < ϕ so that
the minimum of ϕ− v+ is attained and is positive. Thus, there exists some η > 0 such
that ϕ > v+ + η on Tε′. From [39, Lemma 3.8] there exists a non increasing sequence
wn in V+ converging to v+. Then, there exists a positive real n0 ≥ 1 such that for
any n ≥ n0 large enough, ϕ −
η
2 > wn on Tε′. We denote by wn0+ such wn. Thus, for
0 < δ < η2 we define
wδ :=
{
(ϕ− δ) ∧wn0+, on B((t0, x0, y0); ε
′),
wn0+, outside B((t0, x0, y0); ε
′).
Notice that
wδ(t0, x0, y0) = (ϕ(t0, x0, y0)− δ) ∧ wn0+(t0, x0, y0)
≤ ϕ(t0, x0, y0)− δ
< v+(t0, x0, y0). (D.8)
Thus proving that wδ ∈ V+ provides the desired contradiction. From now, we fix
t ∈ [0, T ], a stopping rule τ ∈ Bt and (Z,K) ∈ UY0(t, τ). We need to build a strategy
(P, ν˜) ∈ VY0(t, τ) such that Property (ii+) in the definition 4.3 of a super-solution
holds. Recall that wn0+ ∈ V
+, thus for the fixed (Z,K) ∈ UY0(t, τ), there exists some
elementary strategy (P˜, ν˜1) ∈ VY0(t, τ) such that Property (ii+) in Definition 4.3 holds.
b. Building the elementary strategy and Property (ii+) We consider the following
strategy that we denote by ν˜.
∗ If ϕ − δ < wn0+ at time τ , we choose the strategy (Pˆ, νˆ(Z, 0)), where Pˆ ∈ PA is
such that the minimality condition (ii) in Theorem 3.1 holds with control K,
∗ Otherwise we follow the elementary strategy (P˜, ν˜1).
The rest of this part is completely similar to Step 1., paragraph 1.b. with control
ν˜t := νˆ(Z, 0)1{ϕ−δ<wn0+} + ν˜
1
t 1{ϕ−δ≥wn0+}
,
and considering the event
A˜ :=
{
ϕ(τ ′,Xτ ′ , Yτ ′)− δ < wn0+(τ
′,Xτ ′ , Yτ ′)
}
.
Applying Ito’s formula to ϕ + δ on A˜, and setting σr := σ(r,X ν˜r , νˆ(Z, 0)), we get for
any t ≤ τ ′ ≤ s′ ≤ s ≤ τ ′1
ϕ(s,X ν˜s , Y
ν˜
s ) = ϕ(s
′,X ν˜s′ , Y
ν˜
s′ ) +
∫ s
s′
(∇xϕ+ ∂yϕZ) · σrdW
⋆
r +
∫ s
s′
∂tϕdr
+ g(r,X ν˜r , Y
ν˜
r , ϕ,∇xϕ, ∂yϕ,∆xxϕ, ∂yyϕ,∇xyϕ,Z, 0, νˆ(Z, 0))dr
+
∫ s
s′
∂yϕ(r,X
ν˜
r , Y
ν˜
r )dKs.
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Since K = 0 under Pˆ we have that ϕ is a super–martingale under Pˆ and (ii+) is satisfied
on [τ, τ1]. We thus deduce similarly that wδ ∈ V+ which contradicts (D.8) so that for
any (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ) ×Rd × R
−∂tϕ(t, x, y)−G(t, x, y, ϕ,∇xϕ, ∂yϕ,∆xxϕ, ∂yyϕ,∇xyϕ) ≤ 0
2. The viscosity supersolution property at time T . We now aim at proving that v+(T, x, y) ≤
UP (L(x)− U
−1
A (y)) for any (x, y) ∈ R
d × R. This proof follows the same lines that the pre-
vious step 1.2. We assume by contradiction that there exists (x0, y0) ∈ Rd × R such that
v+(T, x0, y0) > UP (L(x0)− U
−1
A (y0)). By continuity, there exists ε > 0 such that
UP (L(x)− U
−1
A (y)) ≤ v
+(T, x, y)− ε, (x, y) ∈ B((x0, y0); ε).
We define Tε := B((T, x0, y0); ε) \ B((T, x0, y0); ε2). Let η > 0 be small enough such that
v+(T, x0, y0) +
ε2 + 4 ln(1 + ε2)
4η
> ε+ sup
(t,x,y)∈Tε
v+(t, x, y).
Thus, using exactly the same Dini type arguments that in [39, 3], there exists n0 big enough
such that for some wn0 ∈ V
+ we have
v+(T, x0, y0) +
ε2 + 4 ln(1 + ε2)
4η
> ε+ sup
(t,x,y)∈Tε
wn0(t, x, y).
We now define for any λ > 0
ϕε,η,λ(t, x, y) := v+(T, x0, y0) +
‖x− x0‖
2 + ln(1 + |y − y0|)
η
+ λ(T − t).
By using the result of Lemma 4.1, for some λ > 0 large enough, we get for any (t, x, y) ∈
B((T, x0, y0); ε)
−∂tϕ
ε,η,λ(t, x, y)−G(t, x, y, ϕε,η,λ,∇xϕ
ε,η,λ, ∂yϕ
ε,η,λ,∆xxϕ
ε,η,λ, ∂yyϕ
ε,η,λ,∇xyϕ
ε,η,λ) > 0.
In particular, such ϕε,η,λ satisfies on Tε
ϕε,η,λ(t, x, y) ≥ v+(T, x0, y0) +
ε2 + 4 ln(1 + ε2 )
4η
≥ wn0(t, x, y) + ε,
and on B((x0, y0); ε),
ϕε,η,λ(T, x, y) ≥ v−(T, x, y) ≥ UP (L(x)− U
−1
A (y)) + ε.
Thus, for 0 < δ < ε small enough we define
wε,η,λ,δ :=
{
(ϕε,η,λ − δ) ∧wn0+, on B((T, x0, y0); ε),
wn0+, outside B((T, x0, y0); ε).
The rest of the proof is completely similar to the step 1.b, we show that wε,η,λ,δ ∈ V+ and
wε,η,λ,δ(T, x0, y0) = v
+(T, x0, y0) + δ
> v+(T, x0, y0),
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which leads to a contradiction. We deduce that
v+(T, x, y) ≤ UP (L(x)− U
−1
A (y))
for any (x, y) ∈ Rd × R.
General conclusion. In step 1 (resp. in step 2) we have proved that v− is a viscosity super-
solution (resp. v+ is a viscosity sub-solution) of the HJBI equation (4.12). If a comparison theorem
in the viscosity sense holds, then we deduce from (4.15) that
v−(0, x, Y0) ≤ V
P
0 (Y0) ≤ v
+(0, x, Y0) ≤ v
−(0, x, Y0), x ∈ R
d,
which proves the theorem.
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